Would the good employer please step forward? A discussion of the "good employer" concept in the State Sector Act 
Introduction
The reforms of the fourth Labour Government (1984 -1990) in respect of state sector industrial relations and personnel management were, by any estimation, radical. The elimination of public service classifications, the notion of the unified career service, automatic wage linkages with the private sector and compulsory arbitration and their replacement with departmental (", enterprise-based") agreements and job concepts, collective bargaining and senior management contracts was, like the Public Service Act 1912, an exercise in revolution not evolution (Martin, 1988, p.l) . Coupled with Labour's corporatization and privatization programme and associated redundancies, the rẽfot1ns of pay fixing and employment arrangements have been playing a major role in the drive to create a more efficient state sector which is congruent with the broader need to improve the competitive perfoi1nance of the New Zealand economy (Boston, 1987 (Boston, , 1988 Deane, 1989a Deane, , 1989b Scott and Gorringe,1989; Harbridge and Walsh, 1989) . Few revolutions, however, complẽtely repudiate the past. The notion of the "good employer" contained in section 56 of the State Sector . Act 1988 can be seen as an attempt to an attempt is made to provide an historical overviow of pdvate thought since the Industrial Revolution in respect of "good"
Second, key phases in the public sector tradition are examined.
tbese ftistQrieal sketches as a backdrop, some assumptions in respect of the good employer conoept are offered and the Act is explored in tetans of specific processes and policies. A geDeral pattern of public service employee relations is then suggested. Pinally, the article engages in a discussion of the problem of assessing chief executive perfOioutnce under the Act. 2. Private sector management thought and the notion of the good employer
While it is true that New Zealand courts, like courts elsewhere, have develo~ a concept of the "good and considerate" employer (Deeks and Boxall, 1989,p.l71) or Jood industrial practice" (Hughes, 1990, p.l929 ) in relation to the termination of employment. the role of the courts is not to establish a comprehensive theory of "SQOd" employment that can be applied by employers in the totality of their dealings With staff. Contemporary management thought in respect of the employment reladonship is increasingly dominated by the notions associated with the term "human resource management" (HRM). While some have simply adopted the HRM tern1 in a generic sense and therefore in a way that does not indicate how thinking has deparred from traditions, another line of argument (Beer et al., 1984; Boxall and Dowling, 1990) sees HRM as emphasising the need to take an investment-oriented and strategic approach to employment relations at the level of the enterprise. Emphasis is placed on the importance of developing human capital. The classical assumption of management accountancy in respect of expenditure on employees (i.e. that it is of a revenue rather tban a capital nature) is therefore challenged. The strategic approach calls for the development of a finn-specific human resource strategy which is integrated with sbategic worked out in the light of an array of stakeholder interests and critical environmental factors and expressed in a consistent set of policy signals. (Boxall, 1990a; Boxall and Dowling, 1990) . It therefore seeks to draw human resource policies more fully into the realm of general management and draw general managers more fully into the development of human resource policies.
As a framework for thinking about good employment behaviour, the HRM approach has 2 advantages over industrial pluralism. First, it has a much more sophisticated (though not unproblematic) grip on the relationship between product market sttategies and employee relations policies (Schuler and Jackson, 1987) . Second, it stresses the importance of investment in human resources as well as the importance of building healthy industrial/human relations. In effect, it takes the position that the cmditional focus of industrial relations practice and scholarship-the establishment of employment "rules" that generate workforce "compliance" -is no longer a sufficient basis for management's needs or for analysis of the system. In the light of escalating competitiveness in product markets, the ascendancy of the knowledge-based and the demographic and attitudinal changes in the labour market, management · needs a framework which acknowledges the relevance of a more sophisticated set of goals -commitment, flexibility, innovation and the like (Beer et al., 1984; Guest, 1987; Boxall and Dowling, 1990) . HRM offers much more specific help to practidoners in relation to issues such as skill formation and individual employee development and retention than can be found in the classical pluralist approach .
Before we leave this overview of private sector management thought, a general point must be made about all of these philosophies. To borrow a metaphor from Herbert Simon, they are all examples of "bounded" goodness. There is no notion of unbounded employer goodness in the private sector. Employers are not employers first and foremost, they are business people. This means that even the most benevolent employer (by whatever standard one applies) will at times have to resort to "hard" commercial decisions which lead, for example, to workforce reduction or a period of belt-tightening in wages and conditions. A good employer will weather a strike without caving in where it is important ttl do so (Purcell, 1981) . By failing to take such decisions when they are called for, of course, the "good" employer runs the risk of losing the opportunity to be any sort of employer. The obvious lesson for individual employees is the need to take thought for one's own career development and what might be called "personal labour market strength". To rely exclusively on one employer's benevolence or restrict one's skill developm. ent . exclusively ttl skills valued by one finn would be very shortsighted.
The argument that shall now be advanced in this paper is that unbounded goodness is also unrealistic in the public sector. Whatever the good employer concept means in the context of the contemporary New Zealand public sector it cannot mean some sort of undisciplined "warm fuzzy" notion. This, of course, is obvious to anyone who has lived through the r. estructuring of the last few years.
Public sector trad· itions
In respect of both Britain and New Zealand it is easy to identify 3 broad phases of thinking in relation to public sector personnel management and industrial relations. Again, the intention is not to describe these philosophies in depth but to point to the trend in thought.
Historic patronage
The earliest traditions of public sector personnel management were built around "offices" granted by the Crown, a system which lasted well into the eighteenth century (Fredman and Morris, 1989) . In the UK, the dismantling of patronage is associated with the Northcote-Trevẽlyan Report of 1853 which recommended competitive examinations at entry and promotion on merit (Wilenski, 1986; Fr· edman and Morris, 1989) . In New Zealand, the watershed date is 1912 which saw the report of the Hunt Commission and the Public Service Act (Robertson, 1974; Deeks and Boxall, 1989) .
Weberian bureaucracy
Patronage was replaced with the notion of a "salaried, permanent and politically neutral civil service" (Fredman and Morris, 1989, p.13 ) which grew to bear the hall. marks of a Weberian bureaucracy.
In Australia, the Coombs report (1976) on government administration (quoted in Wilenski, 1986, p.203 ) defined the career seiVice as meaning:
(a) recruiunent by merit (however defined and detennined) to a (b) unified service (intended to mitigate the evils which result from a fragmentary service) subject to (c) independent, non-political control of recruitment and of the conditions of employment; and where the rights of career public servants are protected by (d) regulations which discourage the base grade, and by (e) legislated protection against arbibaay by due process).
And exhibiting (f) a hierarchical structure of positions defmed by (g) a regular system of position classification of salaries (with incremeatal advaa ·,l"i"',, ..• , .
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within the salary ranges of particular positions), with the ca•oer public -~ . . . . through this hierarchy of positions according to (h) a system of promotion by merit subject to (i) a system of appeals against promotions (designed to ensure that justice is seeD 18 be done)-the final reward for long and loyal service being G) a distinctive retirement and pension system. This description fits equally well the situation that prevailed in New Zealand from the Public Service Act1912 through the State Services Act 1962 and up to the refonns of the fourth Labour Government (Martin, 1988, p.13-14) . However, the description does not completely define the model. To it must be added the elements of "fair relativity" in pay with respect to the private sector, a relatively consultative approach to industrial relations management in the context of compulsory arbitration, and state leadership in respect of equal pay and equal employment opportunity. That this son of system has broken down in the UK and New Zealand under the weight of a desire to streamline the public sector and a sustained critique of the presuppositions of the ca•eer service model is no longer news.
Accountable management
The new model adopted in the UK by the Thatcher administration and by the foUJ1h New Zealand Labour Government might conveniently be labelled "accountable management" to borrow a te1an first used by the Fulton Committee in the UK in 1968 but not fleshed out comprehensively until the advent of the more competitive economic conditions of the 1980s with their concomitant pressure for public sector resttucturing. The notion of accountable management in the public service stands alongside a detennination to corporatize and, as far as possible, privatize state trading activities (Boston, 1987 (Boston, , 1988 Deane, 1989a Deane, , 1989b . Both strands of public sector refoiiil are designed to reduce excessive layers of administration and excess staffmg and pinpoint accountability for results in a way that improves the efficiency of the state sector. Chief executive and SES contracts under the State Sector Act are a prominent feab1re of the new "management culture". So is the power of the government to decline the recommendation of the State Services Commission in respect of a chief executive appointment (s.35), a power which has recently been exercised in relation to the Ministry of Defence (Boston, 1990) .
As in the private sector, then, the ascendancy of "accountable management" makes it clear that the good public sector employer must be regarded as exhibiting "bounded" goodness. Goodness is bounded by a concern to keep the size of the state within economically sustainable limits, to ensure it behaves commercially where it engages in commercial activity and to make executive accountability more readily manageable through the practice of negotiating specific perfo1n1ance agreements rather than subscribing to the notion of a "unified career service". This doesn't mean, of course, that individuals will be unable to develop powerful public service careers. The large organizations with significant job opportunities and the strong networks are still there.
However, public service careers will take on more of the characteristics of private sector careers -most notably, specific perfotnaance contracts, perfottnance-related pay and the need for individuals to take ultimate responsibility for their own employment security (through, for example, developing flexible skills and experience and a track record of respected achievements).
The advent of the State Sector Act 1988
The fourth Labour Government used 2 main legislative vehicles to advance its model of accountable management -the State-· Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986 (which corporatized certain state trading entities and laid the basis for subsequent privatization) and the State Sector Act 1988 which codified its new attitude to employment relations in the public service. ' The economic, political and ideological forces that paved the way for these refonns, along with a variety of perspectives on their desirability, have receivẽd substantial attention (Boston, 1987 (Boston, , 1988 Brosnan and McCarthy, 1988. ; Deane, 1989a, I989b; Deeks and'Boxall, 1989; Harbridge and Walsh, 1989; Martin. , 1988 , Mascarenhas, 1988 Scott and Gorringe, 1989; Scott, Bushnell and Sallee, 1990; Walsh, 1989; Walsh and Fougere, 1989; Walsh and Wetzel, 1990) . The intention of this article is not to review these works in depth. What is important, however, is to acknowledge first that the insupportable size of the fiscal deficit in New Zealand made reform of the state sector inevitable (Martin, 1988) . Such reform was seen as essential within the broader context of economic restructuring and was targeted not only by Roger Douglas but also by David Lange and Geofffey Palmer (Boston, 1987) . Second, certain ascendant ideological forces, principally Trẽasury's advocacy of public choice theory and the "new institutional" economics, provided this refo1 111 mandate with its characteristic shape (Boston. , 1987; Martin, 1988; Scott and Gorringe, 1989; Scott et a/., 1990) . Economic necessity and a govẽmment committed to acting on it ensured that r· efot 111 would take place. The nature of those reforms as they affected employment relations in the state -called here "accountable manage. ment" -are the outworking in legislation of ideas associated (primarily) with public choice and agency theory (this is made most explicit in Scott and Gorringe, 1989) . The way in which the Labour Government pushed through these reforms without a robust consultative process has been described by Walsh (1989) . Again, this is not the issue in this article although it clearly undermined the Government's credibility in terms of its own commitment to consultative management. The purpose of this article is to analyze the implications of the good employer provisions as written into law.
The good employer principle -an exploration
Our task is to develop a theory of the good employer which operates within the context just outlined, observes the specific provisions of the Act and stands up as a coherent framework for management action. This is no easy matter.
Assumptions
The tensions embedded in the notion of bounded goodness are apparent in the Act. How are public sector managers to steer a course through this terrain? Before identifying important processes and policies, it is vital to make certain assumptions about "good employer attitudes". The Act itself does not set out explicit assumptions but any chief ẽxecutive who wishes to comply with it will find it difficult to do so unless able to work from some logically related principles. employees in all aspects of their employment". They enable me to integrate wbat is actually specified in the Act within the broader framework that is not made explicit but which the statute recognizes is necessary. Section 56(2) indicates that good enaployer behaviour should not be confined to a legalistic conformity with what is specified in the statute. Something greater (quite rightly) is required. Here, then, are the implications ef my assumptions and their relationship to the specific provisions cited in the AcL The analysis should make it clear that the Act provides chief executives with important areas of "strategic choice".~
Process and policy implications
Internal communications First of all, this analysis is based on the view that employees define their own interests and decide how to express them. This means that the good employer must study the views of the employees and build strong internal communications. Regular team briefings and feedback sessions, joint consultative committees, workforce surveys, upward reporting on management perforn1ance, exit interviews and regular perfonnance appraisal and career development reviews are eumples of the sort of formal mechanisms employers use to give effect to this proposition (Rothwell 1990) . Management training to improve informal interpersonal skills is also common. While none of these mechanisms is specified in the State Sector Act, it takes little effort to see that the general concept is strongly supported in contemporary employment practice (wibless, for example, the growth of team briefing in New Zealand manufacturing in recent years). To be good at employing, one must build strong, . ,...... Union-management relations The philosophy outlined also means that the good employer recognizes the union or unions that their employees choose. Conversely, they respect the right of employees not to choose unionization. More generally, irrespective of whether labour law allows employees to choose their own bargaining agent, the good employer works within whatever legislative framework prevails to create a basis for mutual respect in management-union relations and supports the role of the union in giving voice to employee interests. The objective is to build what some have called "mature adversarialism" {Adams, 1989). Besides a positive approach to collective bargaining, this implies the development of joint consultation and joint problem solving to maximize shared interests and shared energies. It may well involve other fonns of joint decision-making that the parties deem appropriate. In contrast, immature adversarialism focuses only on conflict of interest and is characterized by rigid defence of "prerogatives" on the one hand and low trust responses on the other. One interpretation of post-refotan industrial relations patterns in the state sector generally is to suggest that while some state entities have made progress towards matur, e adversarialism, others have so far exhibited an immature style. ' The latter, seeking to distance themselves from what they regard as historically uncommercial industrial relations approaches, have not yet achieved a union-management felationship in which both conflict and cooperation play an appropriate role.
The creation of joint working parties on such matters as new job evaluation and perfonnance appraisal systems is an example of good employment practice in the state. Of course, it must be remembered that the concept of "bounded goodness" outlined earlier implies that, like the union, management must "reserve" its position in certain matters and at certain times. The good employer cannot make an unreasonable commitment to a job or pay structurẽ which has become inefficient or insupportable, for ẽxample. Thus, as indicated earlier, it is entirely possible that a good employer in the state will find it necessary to "draw a line" at some point and 1nay weather a strike over it.
Staff development and work design When it comes to staff development and work design policy (which must be considered in tandem), the principles I have outlined imply that the good employer will seek to provide strong incentives to employee skill devẽlopment and will seek to maximize the intrinsic intẽrest of work. This is based on the view that neither party has an interest in traditional job demarcations and skill-static Cafeers. If New Zealand business is to compete effectively in the globalized economy, a high skill path is likely to be far more effective than a low skill one (Callister, 1990) . The public sector must mirror this approach and encourage it. The positive contribution of the state sector reforms in this context is the creation, by and large, of a single industrial document in each department. Such documents, as opposed to service-wide occupational classifications, enable the parties to adopt a more radical approach to work design and career path construction. The parties, of course. , must respond to this freedom. A question mark must hang over the Act in terms of whether it provides sufficient incentive for them to do so. While the Act talks of "opportunities for the enhancement of the abilities of individual employees" [s.56(2)(e)], this is a weak expression of the skill fotanation imperative . . It means that, under the statute, departments can be expected to vary substantially in the sophistication of their training and development policies. Having said that, the mere delivery of foa 1nal training and development programmes does not provẽ that worthwhile learning and skill formation has occurred. If chief executives are to be assessed adequately in this ar, ea, some sophisticated thinking will be required in tenus of appropriate mẽasures. And, if the Act fails to stimulate an appropriate climate of lifelong learning that builds and sustains an excellent public service, it must be seen to have failed substantively. Merit-based decision making, EEO and the partnership response In any notion of the good employer, individual personnel decisions (such as appointments and promotions) must be based on merit. In this sense, merit means the use of criteria which can be proved to be relevant to the effective performance of the position and Which are not based on untested assumptions. Untested assumptions frequently contain sex, race and disability bias and, in any event, are an uncommercial appr<?ach to personnel management. Of course, it should be recognized that some organizations use the merit principle to mean "suitability for a career" in the enterprise and do not restrict it to suitability to the specific position. The State Sector Act takes the latter course (see the wording in s.60) although it does require chief executives to ensure that all employees exhibit "concern for the public interest" (s. 56 (3)). The issue can be dealt with, of course, by identifying certain generic departmental criteria and insetting them in all person specifications. One such generic criterion might be to do with the learning orientation of the candidate (in order to appoint only those who have the ability and motivation to keep learning). A focus solely on "merit for the specific position" mns the risk of being shortsighted and encouraging a static attitude to skill fotanation (which works against the dynamic approach advocated in the previous section). It increases the likelihood of redundancy rather than retraining where the position disappears in the course of technological change. Under this general heading, there is also a delicate set of issues for departments in regard to the balance between internal and external recruiting for positions above the base recruitment level. Obviously, organizations which always appoint "outsiders" to the top positions demoralize internal talent. At the other extreme, organizations which attempt to recruit only at the base level and promote strictly from within run the risk of creating a "clone-set" rather than a robust corporate culture -a problem recognized at IBM, for example (Evans et al., 1989) . Somewhere, in between, a balance of policies must be struck that preserves incentives in the internal labour market but draws in outside talent where it can make an important contribution. The demise of the unified career service requires departments to find an appropriate balance in their context but there is no doubt that this will require some experimentation and soul searching.
The merit principle must be recognized as an aspect of the EEO dimension which requires the identification and elimination of barriers (s.58) that perpetuate inequality aftd which implies specific measures to deal with particular employment requirements (such as childcare places). It must also be read in conjunction with the requirement in the ACt and in Te Urupare Rangapu for personnel policies that recognize the aims, aspirations aftd employment requirements of the Maori people and the need for greater involvement Of1be
Maori people in the public service. This requires some sophisticated working __ issues and formulation of specific strategies in individual departmerlts. One practical implication is the development of recruitment procedures that ensure Boxall and Sisley (1990) .
enables both union and management to buihl enable them to modify and redevelop perforn1ance criteria based on a careful prooeas of to 5 years but must then be subject to review. Finally, it should go without saying that .., decision should stand up to the scrutiny of respect of appointments, the Act requires each chief place (s.65). Although not specifically mentioned ia tile .Act.aar perfo1n1ance appraisal should be appealable through a the union. The objective of the good employer, of "due process" in these matters, but to eliminate the causes (fortt11• 1 • -and inequitable application of criteria) that give rise to them.
Pay policies The Act is silent on pay policy except in so far as it empowem tilt State Services Commission to negotiate conditions of employment "in consaltarioa :wid~ the chief executive of each department affected" (s.68). While one would expeot M pattern bargaining across the public service in terms of the size of annual pay · this should not mask the important area of sttategic choice that exists in remnneratioa strategy. Remuneration theory has long argued that the good employer is one wllo seeks to pay those wages which are compatible with ente1p1ise effectiveness and nodOQS of fairness in respect of both internal and external labour markets (Annsbong and Murli&, 1988; Brown, 1989) . The former notion of fairness is typically known as "iniDI•aal equity" and rests on the development of an equitable job grading structure. Arguably, equity is most likely to be achieved where management and the union agree on a job evaluation process which has the twin aims of relating all jobs to a set of values whicb are both "commercially appropriate" and gender neuttal. To be effective, any job evaluation scheme should value those factors that underpin enterprise effectiveness.. Question marks must be raised over any "off-the-shelr' scheme in terms of the mes.qes embedded in its choice of compensatable factors and their weights (Lawler, 1986; . Does such a scheme, for example, place too much emphasis on "control over money and people" and fail to deal adequately with the intrinsic features of wmk altho senior levels of the public service? Is the model of organization implicit in it a "tall 1950s manufacturing hierarchy" or a "flat 1990s service network"? The reforans have provided departments with the opportunity to develop their own system of inte.tnal equities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the quality of what has been done is variable.
The second dimension of fairness is to do with the external labour market -typjcally known as "external competitiveness" or "external equity". This requires a methodology for linking the internal job sttucture to "the market". Of course, the notion of "the market" is far from straightforward (Rynes and Milkovich, 1986 ) and a variety of "policy lines" are possible in tenns of aligning the organization with "it". While a good employer may subscribe to one or more general salary surveys to gain mar.ket information, there is no substitute for conducting one's own data gathering in rela&ioa to the causes of recruitment and retention difficulties. Enterprise effectiveness may justify the payment of temporary market factor allowances to particular occupational group& This approach is preferable to solutions which underanine the integrity of either tbo job evaluation or the perfonnance appraisal system.
There is, of course, a third dimension of fairness -"performance-based eqdy 11 ..
which has historically been important in the management of executives in the privatB sector (Boxall and Sisley, 1990) . The public sector reforms have encouraged to develop perfotn1ance-related pay through the mechanism of "ranges of rates•.
Perfonnance-related pay, where appropriate and where appropriately implemeated, improve both efficiency and equity. It does this primarily by requirin& the of perfotrnance goals or standards (often for the fii"St time) and structuring wmk around them. This can improve role clarity and motivation. It also allows 10081
The good employer 223 atttact and reward high perforaners and thus retain them and allows those with "broken service" or "outside experience" to be paid according to their contribution and not according to their seniority. The effort required to make "merit pay" work, however, should not be underestimated. It depends critically on management's commiunent to build and support a sophisticated perfonnance appraisal system (see above). Employees must perceive the proposed merit pay system, in terms of both design and implementation process, to be tundamentally more equitable than what it is attempting to replace. In some cases, a careful study of the particular issues and context will drive the organization towards skill-based pay or a mixture of perfonnance and skill-based pay. The state sector refo1 n1s have the virtue of allowing departments some freedom in what is usually an evolutionary process of experimentation. Because no pay structure lasts forever, what is important is that departments should build their own skills in respect of pay system design. In this area, a ttack record of consultation and healthy indusuial relations is vital to the ability to keep improving pay systems over time. Or to put it another way, process and policy cannot be separated with impunity.
Em: ployment secur. ity The notion of the good · employer contained in the original shape of the State Sector Act did not contain a commitment to job security. It envisaged the possibility of redundancies (s.66) and, subject to a suitable transfer within the public service not being possible, allowed for teuuination. Although that section of the Act has now been repealed, the public sector is characteriz· ed by a high level of insecurity. The notion of "a job for life" is clearly dead. Arguably, the challenge facing departments is one of creating a more dynamic concept of ẽmployment security rather than a return to a static notion of job security. The fundamental idea of employment security is to make a commitment to employees who are prepared to keep learning but not to make a commiunent to any particular job or job class. Even so, the commitment cannot exclude the possibility of redundancy but only relegate it to the status of the final option. The implications for employees of such a regime have been noted above.
Occupational health and safety Finally, the Act makes specific provision for "good and safe working conditions" (s.56 (2)(a)). The provision of a safe system of work, of course, is an employer duty under any contract of employment (Deeks and Boxall, 1989) but employers vary in the care they invest in safety and occupational health. . It is not controversial to suggest that a good employer should be in the vanguard in these respects. In the public service, one would expect to see measures to deal with the problems of "sick buildings", for example. One would also expect to see employees provided with access to independent advisory resources (such as chaplaincies and psychological services).
Gẽneral Framework A discussion of specific processes and policies always runs the risk that we won't be able to "see the wood for the trees". A typology, such as that outlined by Purcell and Gray (1986) , is useful for identifying the general theme underpinning employee relations (where one . exists). Source: Purcell and Gray (1986); Purcell (1987) .
In this framework (figure 2 and table 1), individuali . . the fit an gives credence to the feelings and sentiments of t;&Cil each employee's capacity and role at work (Purcell, In teuns of the arguments outlined earlier, one would expect public service departments to seek a position that is broadly consistent with the "consultative" approach, that is one that attempts to accommodate both high concern for the individual and recognition of collective representation. However, as emphasized earlier and as recognized in table 1, such an approach will be bounded by efficiency considerations. It must be admitted that few public service departments will be able to marshall the resources associated with the most successful large scale private sector corporations who adopt this strategy. Pay levels, for example, are unlikely to match the private sector leaders. And, of course, it must be admitted that the leading private sector corporations who adopt this strategy are able to build it up comprehensively over a long period of time, largely irrespective of whatever political party is in power. This is obviously not the situation in the public sector.
The other patterns shown in figure 1 are clearly inappropriate. The traditional style falls short of good employer attitudes. The constitutional style is indicative of much traditional industrial relations management in certain conflict-prone private industries (such as construction and transport). Great emphasis is placed on negodatial industrial documents that are observed by "the other side" but often there is a lack of sophisticated thinking in respect of the behavioural implications of management style. It falls shon of a robust HRM approach where all signals to staff (including those embedded in any collective agreement and the manner of its negotiation and application) are carefully integrated. The sophisticated human relations approach has much in common with the consultative one. Many of the same destinations will be reached by both styles. However, the founer style must be discounted to the extent that it is not built on an acceptance of the right of employees to choose how to express their interests.
6. The assessment of chief executive employment performance
The principle of holding the . chief executive accountable for the quality of personnel management and industrial relations in an organization is a good one. This sends a messagẽ about the importance of employment matters, helps to encourage the integration of such matters into the realm of general management and recognizes the role of chief executives in deteunining reporting levels, building an executive team, spearheading policy development and allocating resources. It recognizes a key premise in the theory of HRM.
Having . said that, the demands placed upon chief executives by the . Act are awesome. On any reading, the Act requires the simultaneous achievement of effectiveness (in tet n1s of contracted outputs) and efficiency (in tenus of resource management) on the one hand and equity and integrity goals on the other (see s.35 (12)). This is a tall order. As argued in this paper, it implies an understanding that the notion of the good employer is a "bounded" one. The State Sector Act must be regarded as a statute which contains both personnel management refonns and financial : management ones. As Walsh . and Fougere (1989, p.221) 
put it:
The State Sector Act had dual pohcy objectives. On the one hand, it was intended to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the core state sector and thus help the Government r· ealise its public sector management policy objectives. On the other hand, the Act was intended as an instrument of fiscal management. It abolished the AGA and compulsory arbitration and eliminated block service-wide negotiations on conditions of employment. All workers were now required to negotiate pay and conditions in direct bargaining with employers. This made "hard budgets"' possible for the first time in the state S· ector ...
'II
Any assessment of a chief executive's perfonuance as a good employer must take account, then, of "the need to take the hard decisions" where appropriate. The fourth Labour Government has engineered a reform of the state sector which has produced major redundancies and placed chief executives within a framework which recognizes diminished security and scarce resources. Whether this new framework brings about a stable and effective regime of employee relations in the public service is as much a test of the Act as it is of chief exẽcutives.
In my view, the critical test of chief executives is whether they can bring about a strategic approach to human resource management in their department This requires the building of a vision within senior management of the kind of employer the department can and should be. , given its particular traditions, projected mission and the specific opportunities and problems it faces as an organization and an ẽmployer. This is easier said than done . . It implies a sophisticated dialogue and debate within management itself in rẽspect of alternative employment policies. It also implies a fierce commitment to draw the individual objectives and partial paradigms of particular managers and human resoufce specialists into a model of employer behaviour which exhibits a consistent set of themes. ' The refoiius of the public sector contain the potential for deparunents to "fire off in all directions". Bringing the pieces t8piJIIII general management task.
It is also important to realize that the attained their leadership as employers oveftliald. tenn endeavour that is ill-at-ease with the typieat foe'll reporting periods and short-tetln measures (Starey and executive on a 5 year contract to arrive at all simultaneously is unrealistic. However, it is reasonable of progress in the processes, programmes and relationships dtat The job itself will never be finished.
Conclusions
Economic necessity ensured that the fourth Labour GovemmeDt would sector management. In respect of public service personnel and relations, those refornas are primarily expressed in the State Sector Act 1918. 'fNdlill philosophical underpinnings in public choice theory and the new eccmeaca. the Act is an expression of "accountable management". The notion of the good emf(oyar contained in it must be understood as a bounded one. It is bounded by a conceiii to keep the size of the state within economically sustainable limits, to enswe it bollaves commercially where it engages in commercial activity and to make ·ve accountability more readily manageable.
Under the Act, chief executives are required to behave as good employers. The Act provides chief executives with considerable sttategic choice in giving effect ro this requirement. It does not define the term in an exhaustive manner. Rather, secdon 56 implies that it is the role of each chief executive to develop a customized employing philosophy or human resource strategy in their department. A legalistic implementation of only those items specified in the statute itself would fall short of this implicit standard.
This article has pointed to a number of process and policy domains where chief executives must exercise strategic choice. Interesting questions include the extent to which chief executives will build strong direct communications with employees and the kind of relationships they will seek to build with unions. There are also issues relating to the way in which the merit principle is interpreted -whether in relation to the specific position applied for or in relation to a more dynamic career concept Similarly, there are questions relating to the balance between internal and external recruibnent and in relation to the development of recruitment procedures that uphold EEO principles without undermining the consistency of the selection process. Similarly, there is a substaRtial area of strategic choice in the area of pay policy. While the notion of compadbility between enterprise effectiveness and the "3 equities" (external, internal and perf0111l111Ce-based) is easily subscribed to, its implementation involves significant choices and considerable determination. And, perhaps most importantly, the area of bainiDg aad development invites a wide variation of interpretation. To the extent that this repne of public sector personnel management fails to encourage vigorous skill f01mation, it might be argued that it fails substantively.
Piecemeal perspectives on particular aspects of the employment relationsbip, of course, fall short of what is necessary to manage a modem workforce in a manner. Given the values implicit in the State Sector Act, one would expect to seewbat Purcell and Gray ( 1986) define as a general pattern of consultative manage•neat emergiag in the public service. The critical test of chief executives under this swutB is not whether they can push a little here or a little there on fashionable bat whether they can draw the pieces together into a coherent whole. Satisfactory on this criterion should be the primary test of chief executive performance UDder
